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Enhancing Tribal Sovereignty by Protecting Indian Civil Rights: A Win-Win for 
Indian Tribes and Tribal Members 
Rob Roy Smith1 
I. Introduction 
Imagine receiving a letter from the United States government informing you that 
you are no longer considered a United States citizen. “It couldn’t happen here,” you 
might say. However, with growing frequency across the country, citizens of federally 
recognized Indian tribes are told by their Indian tribal governments that they have been 
disenrolled (removed from their tribe’s membership rolls) or, worse, banished 
(disenrolled and barred from tribal lands and events).2 Worse still, a growing number of 
tribal members find themselves deprived of their basic civil rights by their Indian tribal 
governments without any recourse to challenge their summary loss of tribal identity and 
loss of tribal services, including health care, education, and housing support.3 Tribal 
banishments and disenrollments have long been among the reserved sovereign powers 
of tribal governments,4 typically reserved for use against those who are not lawfully 
considered members or those members who have committed a heinous crime that 
                                                 
1
 Mr. Smith is a shareholder with the Seattle, Washington office of Ater Wynne LLP. He is co-chair of the 
firm’s Indian law practice group. Mr. Smith advises Indian tribal clients and those doing business in Indian 
country on all aspects of federal law, including economic development, natural and cultural resource 
protection, taxation, tribal sovereignty and gaming. He has extensive experience involving all aspects of 
litigation and business transactions involving Indian tribes. Prior to joining Ater Wynne, Mr. Smith worked 
for the Nez Perce Tribe’s Office of Legal Counsel in Lapwai, Idaho, and the law firm of Morisset, 
Schlosser, Jozwiak & McGaw in Seattle. He was the co-founder and is the immediate past chair of the 
Idaho State Bar Indian Law Section. Mr. Smith serves as an adjunct professor of federal Indian law at 
Seattle University School of Law and as the Washington State Bar Indian law lecturer for BarBri. 
2
 Individual Indian civil rights advocates claim that 1,500 people have been banished from twenty-three 
tribes nationwide between 1995 and 2006. Jason B. Johnson, Former Pomo leader expelled from tribe, 
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, May 1, 2006, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/05/01/BAG4AIIF6H1.DTL. Articles further suggest that as many as 4,000 
people have been disenrolled from tribes in California since 2006. Michael Martinez, Indians decry 
banishment by their tribes, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 14, 2006, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-01-
14/news/0601140134_1_tribal-casino-american-indians-gaming-profits. For instance, the Temecula Band 
of Luiseño Mission Indians of the Pechanga Indian Reservation of California has disenrolled about 15 
percent of its members. LaMere v. Super. Ct., 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). Heated 
enrollment and banishment disputes continued in 2009. See, e.g., More than 700 removed from 
Chukchansi Tribe, INDIANZ.COM, Mar. 2, 2009, http://www.indianz.com/News/2009/013364.asp; Lynda V. 
Mapes, Snoqualmie banishment case ripping apart tribe, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2008765115_snoqtrial20m0.html. There is also the 
related issue of the disenrollment of the Cherokee Freedmen. See Alex Kellogg, Cherokee Nation Faces 
Scrutiny For Expelling Blacks, NPR, Sept. 19, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/09/19/140594124/u-s-
government-opposes-cherokee-nations-decision; James Dao, In California, Indian Tribes With Casino 









seriously offends their respective Indian tribe’s culture, traditions, or laws.5 Recently, 
however, tribal banishments and disenrollments appear to be increasingly used to bar 
speech, prevent political confrontations, and to limit the scope of tribal benefits.6 The 
actions of these tribal governments threaten more than just the individual rights of tribal 
members. The very nature of tribal sovereignty and tribal self-governance is at risk.  
The question is whether individual Indian civil rights and tribal sovereignty can 
coexist. For centuries, Indian tribes have banished their members as punishment for 
serious offenses, and some advocates believe that imposing Anglo-style civil rights 
protections on Indian cultural practices amounts to continued paternalism.7 Indian tribal 
governments, however, are not and should not be immune to shifting legal doctrines 
that afford greater rights to tribal members. Providing the basic protections of the Indian 
Civil Rights Act (ICRA),8 such as due process and equal protection of laws, benefits 
both Indian tribes and individual tribal members. Ensuring the protection of civil rights of 
tribal members promotes trust in tribal institutions, avoids litigation, Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) interference, and negative media publicity, and, most importantly, 
strengthens tribal sovereignty by allowing tribes to craft tribal institutions that will protect 
tribal members’ rights in a manner that best comports with tribal laws, customs, and 
traditions.  
Tribes can and should take action now to adopt procedures that provide tribal 
members with meaningful due process rights to challenge tribal governmental actions 
that threaten their Indian civil liberties. An administrative process and a tribal court is not 
too much to ask when the alternative is considered: costly and embarrassing litigation, 
in addition to possible Congressional intervention. Indeed, two recent cases, Sweet v. 
Hinzman9 and Jeffredo v. Macarro,10 provide important examples of litigation arising out 
of questionable tribal government decisions affecting their members’ civil liberties. The 
former, an egregious case involving the Snoqualmie Tribe in Washington State, signifies 
the dangers of unilateral tribal government decisions when banishments are made 
without oversight or review procedures. The latter provides a scenario wherein the 
Pechanga Band of Luiseño Indians in California tribal government walked a fine line 
before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, ultimately prevailing in the case but also 
receiving a warning from the panel’s dissent that disenrollment by a tribe could be 
gravely harmful to its former members. 
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 See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 n.23 (1963) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
6
 The Dry Creek Band of Pomo Indians in California is considering a “code of conduct” that could lead to 
fines and banishment for members who criticize the tribe. Tribal leaders came up with the idea in hopes 
of protecting tribal businesses. The conduct code is proposed at a time when more that 140 members are 
facing disenrollment. Dry Creek Band delays action on “code of conduct,” INDIANZ.COM, Mar. 31, 2009, 
http://64.38.12.138/News/2009/013855.asp. 
7
 See, e.g., Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to 
Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251, 166–67 (1995). 
8
 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303. 
9
 Sweet v. Hinzman, 634 F.Supp.2d 1196 (W.D. Wash. 2008). 
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This article provides an overview of the struggles faced by both individual tribal 
members and tribal governments as they come to terms with growing demands for 
greater protection of the rights and freedoms of individual tribal members from what is 
perceived to be arbitrary governmental actions, much of which is being subjected to the 
harsh light of non-Indian media scrutiny. Part II provides a brief overview of the ICRA. 
Part III discusses banishment litigation as it relates to the ICRA. Part IV explores the 
first ever banishment trial under the ICRA held in federal court in Washington State in 
2009, challenging a tribal banishment action. Part V discusses a 2009 decision from the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejecting Pechanga tribal member efforts to challenge a 
disenrollment action. Finally, Part VI discusses due process requirements under the 
ICRA, and suggests a meaningful framework that Indian tribes can follow to provide 
their members with civil rights protections in a manner that avoids future judicial and 
media defeats where issues of race and citizenship in Indian country meet.  
II. Overview Of The Indian Civil Rights Act 
ICRA was passed by Congress in 1968 to impose upon tribal governments 
certain restrictions and protections afforded by the US Constitution’s Bill of Rights.11 
ICRA represents a significant congressional intrusion into the internal affairs of Indian 
tribes prompted in part by US Supreme Court cases such as Talton v. Mayes, which 
confirmed that Indian tribes were not bound by the guarantee of individual rights found 
in the Fifth Amendment.12 However, ICRA did not impose all of the protections afforded 
by the Bill of Rights to Indian tribes. Specifically, the act did not impose the 
establishment clause, the guarantee of a republican form of government, the 
requirement of a separation of church and state, the right to a jury trial in civil cases, or 
the right of indigent defendants to appointed counsel in criminal cases upon tribes.13 
Tribes may adopt other protections as part of a tribal “Bill of Rights” if they so choose.14   
                                                 
11
 One of the main purposes of ICRA was to “‘secur[e] for the American Indian the broad constitutional 
rights afforded to other Americans,’ and thereby to ‘protect individual Indians from arbitrary and unjust 
actions of tribal governments.’” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978) (quoting S. REP. 
NO. 90-841, at 5–6 (1967)). 
12
 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding that individual rights protections, which limit federal, and later, state 
governments, do not apply to tribal governments). 
13
 25 U.S.C. § 1302. ICRA was amended in 1986 to increase the sentencing limitations in § 1302(a)(7). 
This provision originally limited tribes to imposing sentences for a single offense to no greater than six 
months imprisonment or a fine of $500, or both. ICRA was amended again as part of the Tribal Law and 
Order Act of 2010 to provide further tribal court criminal sentencing enhancements under certain 
circumstances. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258. 
14
 Many Indian tribes responded to ICRA by adopting similar provisions as a “Bill of Rights” in their tribal 
constitutions. See, e.g., SNOQUALMIE TRIBE OF INDIANS CONST. art. XI, available at 
http://www.snoqualmienation.com/Documents/Constitution.pdf. Some tribal constitutions, such as that of 
the Cahto Tribe of Laytonville Rancheria in California, require enrollment ordinances to be approved by 
the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). When a disenrollment occurs under these 
circumstances, the BIA is vested with the authority to review the disenrollment for compliance with Tribal 
law. See Cahto Tribe of the Laytonville Rancheria v. Dutschke, No. 2:10-CV-0136-GEB-GGH, 2011 WL 
4404149 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2011) (affirming BIA decision reversing disenrollment action against Sloan 
family). However, such tribal constitutional provisions are the exception and not the rule. Therefore, most 




While ICRA imposed some limitations on tribes, ICRA did not represent a windfall 
for tribal members. Congress severely limited the ability tribal members have to compel 
Indian tribes to provide the promised individual civil rights to members. Congress only 
provided that the “privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, 
in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian 
tribe.”15 Filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and meeting the requirements for 
issuance of such a writ, are thus the only means provided to individual tribal members 
to challenge such an action in federal court.  
Initially, it appeared that the habeas limitation might not be so narrow after all. 
Following the passage of ICRA until 1978, federal courts heard eighty cases involving 
the application of ICRA, addressing tribal election disputes, tribal government employee 
rights, tribal membership and voting, and the conduct of tribal council members and 
council meetings.16 However, the idea that ICRA vested federal courts with the power to 
broadly hear claims of civil rights violations committed by tribal governments changed in 
1978, with the seminal US Supreme Court decision in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.17   
Santa Clara involved a challenge to a tribal ordinance denying tribal membership 
to children of female (but not male) members who married outside the tribe as a 
violation of ICRA’s equal protection provision.18 The court rejected the claim, finding that 
tribal common law sovereign immunity prevented a suit against the tribe and that 
Congress did not create a private cause of action in ICRA; rather, relief could only be 
available through a writ of habeas corpus.19 The court also erected another hurdle to 
such cases by agreeing with the tribe that it had not waived its inherent sovereign 
immunity to the suit by Ms. Martinez.20   
Tribal members seeking relief under ICRA have had limited access to the federal 
courts and limited remedies since.21 ICRA neither permits a tribal member whose rights 
are violated to collect money damages against the tribal government, nor does it 
authorize an injunction.22   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
jurisdiction to consider any appeal from the decision of an Indian tribe to disenroll one of its members. 
See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32. 
15
 25 U.S.C. § 1303. 
16
 See, e.g., Indian Civil Rights Act, TRIBAL COURT CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.tribal-
institute.org/lists/icra.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2012). 
17
 436 U.S. at 62 (noting that the habeas provision was designed to strike a balance between two 
competing objectives: to strengthen “the position of individual tribal members vis-à-vis the tribe” and “to 
promote the well-established federal ‘policy of furthering Indian self-government.’”). 
18
 Id. at 51. 
19
 Id. at 59, 62. 
20
 Id. at 59. 
21
 FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 14.02[2], at 956–57 (2005 ed.); see also Poodry v. 
Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 892 (2d Cir. 1996) (discussing similar habeas cases). 
22




III. Post-Santa Clara Indian Civil Rights Act Litigation 
Santa Clara dealt a severe blow to tribal members’ ability to sue under ICRA. 
This is because the writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy available only 
where there is a criminal sanction, some element of detention, and all other available 
remedies have been exhausted.23 As a result, there are only three post-Santa Clara 
ICRA cases brought by tribal members in federal courts that have survived motions to 
dismiss to reach a decision on the merits of their claims. These cases highlight the 
inability of tribal members to protect their rights except in the most egregious of 
circumstances (such as banishment without recourse in tribal court) and the risks that 
Indian tribes face when their tribal processes are opened to federal court scrutiny. 
The leading case with respect to the availability of writs of habeas corpus under 
ICRA is Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians.24 In Poodry, five members of 
the Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians petitioned for writs of habeas corpus under 
ICRA, challenging the legality of orders summarily issued by members of the tribal 
council purporting to convict them of “treason” and sentencing them to permanent 
“banishment” from the tribe’s reservation without any hearing.25 There was no 
applicable tribal court. The Second Circuit held that federal courts have subject matter 
jurisdiction to entertain applications for writs of habeas corpus to afford “petitioners 
access to a federal court to test the legality of their ‘convict[ion]’ and subsequent 
‘banishment’ from the reservation.”26 The court reasoned that “banishment” was 
sufficiently akin to a criminal sanction for habeas relief to be warranted and “actual 
physical custody is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for federal habeas review.”27 
Banishment is the most extreme punishment in Indian country, usually reserved for 
capital crimes such as murder or drug dealing.28 The banished lose all rights to enter 
tribal land, to receive tribal benefits, or even to claim Indian identity.29 
Following the Poodry decision, a California federal district court exercised 
jurisdiction in 2004 to hear a habeas due process challenge to a summary tribal 
disenrollment and banishment action in Quair v. Sisco.30 The court in Quair held that 
banishment is a “detention in the sense of a severe restriction on petitioners’ liberty not 
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 Poodry, 85 F.3d at 890–93. 
24
 Id. at 874. 
25
 Id. at 874–79. 
26
 Id. at 879, 897. 
27
 Id. at 889–891, 893. The court found that the fact that there was no criminal proceed per se irrelevant 
because allegations of “treason” and “actions to overthrow the government” were such that the court 
reasoned these to represent “criminal conduct,” for which banishment was a sanction “punitive in nature.” 
The court further stated that a focus on “custody” or detention was misplaced; instead, the court focused 
upon “the ‘severity’ of an actual or potential restraint on liberty.” The court found that the tribe was not 
implicated by the case against individual tribal council members whom were alleged to have acted 
outside the scope of their lawful authority so tribal sovereign immunity did not apply. Id. at 894, 899–900. 
28
 Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1103 (2007); Patrice H. 
Kunesh, Banishment as Cultural Justice in Contemporary Tribal Legal Systems, 37 N.M. L. REV. 85, 88–
89 (2007).L. REV. 85, 88 (2007). 
29
 See, e.g., Jeffredo v. Macarro, 590 F.3d 751, 764–65 (9th Cir. 2009). 
30




shared by other members of the Tribe,” and exercised its jurisdiction because all 
available tribal remedies had been exhausted.31 
The key fact in both cases—the same fact that allowed the federal court’s 
jurisdiction—was the manner in which the summary banishments took place. For 
example, if the tribes in Poodry and Quair had provided, at minimum, due process or a 
functioning tribal court, the federal courts would likely not have had habeas jurisdiction 
under ICRA to hear the cases. Likewise, if the tribes had only disenrolled the members 
without banishing them, the federal courts might not have had jurisdiction to hear the 
ICRA claims.32 Indeed, the litigation avenues provided to tribal members under ICRA 
are limited; however, this should not mean that tribes should consider themselves to 
have carte blanche to act with respect to tribal member rights when banishments and 
disenrollments take place. A prime example of what can happen when an Indian tribe 
banishes tribal members without regard for tribal law or procedures is the Snoqualmie 
banishment dispute in Washington State.  
IV. The Snoqualmie Banishments 
In late 2007, a government control and voting dispute erupted within the 
Snoqualmie Indian Tribe.33 After an April 27, 2008 banishment meeting, on May 9, 
2008, the tribal council passed a resolution summarily banishing nine Snoqualmie tribal 
members, including the former chairman, former members of the tribal council, and 
some of their relatives, for alleged “treasonous” crimes, including meeting with the BIA 
and, in one instance, saying a prayer that offended the tribal leadership.34 The nine 
tribal members were never allowed to contest the banishments, partly because the tribe 
has no tribal court.35 In May 2008, the banished tribal members sought a writ of habeas 
corpus to challenge the banishments by suing the individual tribal council members who 
executed the banishment resolution.36 They sought relief from the unlawful restraint on 
liberty imposed by the banishment sentence that stripped the members of their tribal 
membership, deprived them of access to vital tribal services, and excluded them from 
tribal lands.37   
Soon after the case was lodged, the tribal council filed two motions to dismiss. 
The council argued, among other things, that that it was immune from suit and that 
there were forums available for Petitioners to exhaust, even though there was no tribal 
court at the time of the banishment.38 Among the many arguments attempting to recast 
Petitioners’ writ as challenging elections and other internal tribal actions that are not 
subject to federal court review, the tribal council’s sovereign immunity was asserted 
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 Id. at 971. 
32
 See, e.g., Hendrix v. Coffey, No. 08-6161, 305 Fed.Appx 495 (10th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction challenging disenrollment action under ICRA). 
33
 Sweet v. Hinzman, 634 F.Supp.2d 1196, 1198 (W.D. Wash. 2008). 
34













vigorously and expansively as a way to block Petitioners from accessing federal courts 
to hear the substance of the due process claims.39   
On September 8, 2008, Judge Robart of the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Washington denied the two motions to dismiss filed by the 
Snoqualmie tribal council member respondents.40 The court held that Poodry is both 
“well-reasoned” and “persuasive,” and therefore “adopts the reasoning and holding of 
the Poodry decision” to reject Respondents’ first effort to have the case dismissed on 
sovereign immunity and other grounds.41 The court also held that tribal sovereign 
immunity did not shield Respondents, who were sued in their official capacity for 
unlawful acts, from Petitioners’ ICRA claims, and that all necessary parties were before 
the court.42 Respondents had argued that Petitioners needed to join, but could not join, 
the entire tribal general membership (all voters) as parties.43   
Importantly, as in Poodry, the Snoqualmie tribal members did not challenge the 
ability of the tribe to exercise its sovereign right to banish tribal members; rather, the 
tribal members challenged the manner in which the banishments were executed by the 
tribal council members.44 The only issue before the court was the legality of the way in 
which the banishments were carried out. This distinction is critical. The fact that the 
challenge was procedural, and not to the substance of the Snoqualmie Tribe’s law, 
traditions, and custom of banishment, enabled the court to review the tribe’s actions. 
Any challenge to the underlying tribal law would have faltered under the principle that 
federal courts will not sit in review of internal membership decisions of the tribe.45 
Upon the completion of discovery, the Sweet case went to trial over two days, on 
February 18 and February 19, 2009, to hear the merits of the Snoqualmie tribal 
members’ due process, equal protection, and confrontation clause claims under ICRA.46 
This was the first trial ever held in federal court concerning a tribal banishment action. 
The trial testimony focused primarily on the Petitioners’ procedural due process claims 
and, in particular, whether the banished members received the required notice and 
opportunity to be heard that procedural due process under the ICRA requires for a 
banishment to be procedurally lawful.  
Numerous legal and factual issues were at play. First and foremost was the 
question of what standards apply to judge the notice and opportunity to be heard 
required by ICRA. Petitioners argued that the inclusion of the rights secured by ICRA as 
part of the Snoqualmie Tribe’s Constitution (the Constitution’s language mirrors that of 
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 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Failure to State A Claim Upon Which 
Relief Can Be Granted, Sweet v. Hinzman, No. CV8-844JLR, 2008 WL 7195733 (W.D. Wash. 2008). 
40
 Sweet, 634 F.Supp.2d at 1202. 
41
 Id. at 1199. 
42




 Id. at 1199. 
45
 “A tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to 
its existence as an independent political community.” Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32; see, e.g., 
Red Bird v. United States, 203 U.S. 76 (1906). 
46




the ICRA) results in the same rights under the United States’ legal system and the 
Snoqualmie system.47 Therefore, “federal constitutional standards are employed in 
determining whether the challenged procedure[s] violate [ICRA].”48 Respondents argued 
that tribal traditions and customs, including a series of banishments in the preceding 
twenty years, should play a role in determining the level of process provided, 
notwithstanding the inclusion of a “Bill of Rights” in the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe’s 
Constitution.49 In particular, Respondents suggested at trial that the Petitioners were 
lucky, as traditionally those accused of the crime of treason would have been sent over 
the Snoqualmie falls in a canoe.50   
Second, Petitioners needed to carry the burden of proving their procedural due 
process claims. For Petitioners to prove a claim under ICRA § 1302(8) for denial of 
procedural due process, they needed to show that they did not receive adequate notice 
or an opportunity to be heard with respect to the April 27, 2008 banishment meeting that 
deprived petitioners of “liberty” interests within the meaning of the Due Process 
Clause.51 As a threshold matter, Petitioners argued that their liberty interests were 
substantial because banishment is an extremely harsh penalty, ultimately meaning that 
Petitioners were barred from tribal lands and events, were removed from tribal rolls, 
were no longer eligible for any tribal benefits and were no longer considered 
Snoqualmie tribal members.52 These substantial liberty interests, argued Petitioners, 
required Respondents to provide Petitioners with more, not less, procedural due 
process.53       
After laying this ground work, Petitioners argued that their procedural due 
process rights were violated by Respondents in four respects: (a) by not providing 
adequate formal notice of the April 27, 2008 banishment meeting to Petitioners; (b) by 
making false charges against Petitioners; (c) by not providing an opportunity for the 
Petitioners to be heard at the April 27, 2008 banishment meeting; and (d) by not 
                                                 
47
 Id. at *8–9. 
48
 Randall v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court, 841 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1988). 
49
 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Failure to State A Claim Upon Which 
Relief Can Be Granted, Sweet v. Hinzman, No. CV8-844JLR, 2008 WL 7195733 (W.D. Wash. 2008); 
Proposed Finding for Federal Acknowledgement of the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, 58 Fed. Reg. 27162-01 
(May 6, 1993) (discussing prior banishments). 
50
 Transcript of Record, Sweet, 2009 WL 1175647. 
51
 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). “‘[D]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a 
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951). Instead, “due process is flexible and calls for 
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 
(1972). “[D]ue process requires the government to ‘provide notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity 
to present their objections.’” Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006) (quoting Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). “The means employed must be such as one 
desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.”  Mullane, 339 U.S. 
at 315. 
52
 Sweet, 2009 WL 1175647, at *1. 
53
 “The more serious the deprivation, the more formal the notice.” Flaim v. Medical College of Ohio, 418 




following their own procedures for voting on banishment.54 With respect to notice, 
Petitioners argued that the notice was not adequate under ICRA. Petitioners received a 
single certified mailing, sent April 18, 2008, containing a Resolution of Discipline and a 
letter dated April 8, 2008.55  The Resolutions refer only to a “April membership meeting” 
that remained vague as to date, time, and location.56 The April 8, 2008 letter indicated 
that a “vote on the recommended banishment . . . will be held at the April 26, 2008 
Special Membership meeting in Issaquah, WA.”57 The “26th” was crossed out and 
written over it was “27” with the initials “MAH.”58 The letter did not provide a specific 
location within Issaquah or a time for the meeting.59 Thus, Petitioners reasoned that in 
considering the “liberty interest that was deprived—tribal identity and a geographic 
restriction on movement—more formal notice was required to . . . apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and to clearly invite Petitioners into the meeting 
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”60  
With respect to opportunity to be heard, Petitioners were never allowed into the 
room where the banishment meeting was held (or even the lobby of Hilton Garden Inn 
in Issaquah where the meeting was held) to plead their innocence of the charges 
against them.61 Petitioners argued that the opportunity to be heard was not sufficient 
under ICRA. Petitioners did not have the new “ID cards” required for entry into the 
meeting.62 And, Petitioners were physically prohibited from entering the Hilton Garden 
Inn at the direction of the Respondents, as well as the hotel manager, tribal security 
staff, and two uniformed and armed Issaquah police officers hired by Respondents.63 
Given these facts and the substantial liberty interests burdened by banishment, 
Petitioners argued that they were entitled to more process than being kept outside on a 
chilly April day, without information from inside the meeting, for almost four hours.64 
On April 30, 2009, the court issued its findings and conclusions in the case, 
emphatically ruling that the petitioners had been denied procedural due process, 
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 Sweet v. Hinzman, No. CO8-844JLR, 2009 WL 1175647, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2009). 
58




 Petitioners’ Trial Brief, Sweet, 2009 WL 4464850. 
61
 Sweet, 2009 WL 1175647, at *3. “Due process requires that a party affected by government action be 
given ‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Southern California 
Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 807 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 
(1976); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (“We have described the 
‘root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause as being ‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a 
hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.’” (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 
371, 379 (1971) (emphasis in original)). 
62
 Sweet, 2009 WL 1175647, at *4. 
63
 Id. at *3. 
64
 Id. at *5. See Lynda V. Mapes, Snoqualmies banish 8, disenroll 60, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 28, 2008, 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2004377888_snoqvote28m.html; Lynda V. Mapes, A 





vacating the banishment, and granting the requested writ of habeas corpus.65 The court 
was careful to note that it “does not believe it should delve into the inner workings of the 
banishment process”66 because the Sweet petitioners did not challenge the ability of the 
tribe to impose the sanction, merely the process by which the sanction was issued. 
Thus, the court concluded that “Petitioners have demonstrated a violation of their right 
to due process.”67 The court made clear that “Petitioners have exhausted all available 
tribal remedies,”68 and that “banishment affects the liberty interests of Petitioners,”69 
such that “under traditional notions of due process, notice and opportunity to be heard, 
the facts combined demonstrate a denial of Petitioners’ right to due process under 
ICRA.”70 As a result, for the first time in the post-Santa Clara era of Indian civil rights 
litigation, the court granted the petition and issued the writ,71 effectively vacating the 
Snoqualmie Tribal Council’s action.    
V. Post-Snoqualmie Decisions 
In December 2009, eight months after the Sweet decision, sixteen former tribal 
members who had argued their civil rights were violated by disenrollment from the 
Pechanga Band of Luiseño Indians in California had their claim rejected by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.72 Jeffredo v. Macarro involved a challenge to a 2006 decision 
of the Pechanga Band to disenroll certain tribal members. The disenrollment meant that 
those members lost numerous important benefits that were available to tribal members 
within the community.73 At the time of their 2006 disenrollment  from the tribe, every 
adult Pechanga member received a per capita benefit of more than $250,000 per year, 
court papers noted.74 Rather than challenge the decision by the tribe’s enrollment 
committee, which was upheld by the tribal council, the disenrolled members filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus contending that their disenrollment was “tantamount 
to an unlawful detention,” under ICRA.75   
A sharply divided Ninth Circuit panel disagreed with the tribal members and 
upheld a lower court’s dismissal of the lawsuit, stating: “Despite the novelty of this 
approach, we nonetheless lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider this claim, 
because Appellants were not detained.”76 The court proceeded to reject the disenrolled 
members claims on a number of grounds. First, the court disagreed with the claim that 
the denial of access to the Senior Citizens' Center, health clinic, and a denial of the 
ability of their children to attend tribal school amounted to unlawful detention.77 Citing 
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Poodry, the court found that the ICRA “does require ‘a severe actual or potential 
restraint on liberty’” and that the denial of access to certain facilities does not pose a 
severe actual or potential restraint on liberty: 
Appellants have not been banished from the Reservation. Appellants have never 
been arrested, imprisoned, fined, or otherwise held by the Tribe. Appellants have 
not been evicted from their homes or suffered destruction of their property. No 
personal restraint (other than access to these facilities) has been imposed on 
them as a result of the Tribe's actions. Their movements have not been restricted 
on the Reservation.78 
In addition, the court emphatically rejected the disenrolled members’ claims that Poodry 
applied equally to their facts: “This is not Poodry. In Poodry, the petitioners were 
convicted of treason, sentenced to permanent banishment, and permanently lost any 
and all rights afforded to tribal members. . . . Appellants have not been convicted, 
sentenced, or permanently banished.”79   
The court further rejected the claim that a living “under a continuing threat of 
banishment/exclusion” is sufficient to satisfy the detention requirement of Section 1303 
of ICRA.80 The court also rejected arguments that disenrollment, the act of stripping the 
disenrolled members of their Pechanga citizenship, is enough of a significant restraint 
on their liberty to constitute a detention. The court stated: “While we have the most 
sympathy for this argument, we find no precedent for the proposition that disenrollment 
alone is sufficient to be considered detention under § 1303,” acknowledging that the 
court’s power to review “relations between and among tribes and their members [is] 
correspondingly restrained.”81   
Finally, the court rejected jurisdiction on two other grounds. First, the court noted 
that it was without jurisdiction to review a direct appeal of a tribal decision regarding 
disenrollment of members, noting that the disenrolled members failed to exhaust tribal 
administrative remedies.82 Second, the court rejected a claim that the disenrollment was 
tantamount to a criminal proceeding.83 The disenrollments, under the court’s analysis, 
were a civil matter, and a federal court’s intervention would circumvent tribal 
sovereignty.84  
The dissent took a different view. In addition to disagreeing that the ICRA only 
vested a federal court with jurisdiction to review a tribal criminal proceeding, not a civil 
proceeding,85 the dissent focused on the deprivations being suffered by the disenrolled 
members as a whole, noting: “The combination of the current and potential restrictions 
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placed upon Appellants and the loss of their life-long Pechanga citizenship constitutes a 
severe restraint on their liberty.”86 The dissent made clear that “[a]lthough with 
disenrollment Appellants retain their United States citizenship and will not be physically 
stateless, they have been stripped of their life-long citizenship and identity as 
Pechagans. This is more than just a loss of a label, it is a loss of a political, ethnic, racial 
and social association.”87 The dissent, as a matter of policy, hits the mark. Banishment 
and disenrollment decisions directly affect the social interactions, cultural identity, and, 
to the extent the actions end tribal benefits, economic well-being of tribal people.  
 The Jeffredo decision did not reference the Sweet case, possibly because of the 
timing of the two decisions. However, both Sweet and Jeffredo rely on the same 
cases—Poodry and Quair—to reach starkly different results. Sweet and Jeffredo, in 
some respects, are outliers. Whereas Sweet offered shocking facts of refusal to allow 
an opportunity to be heard and no available tribal forum to challenge a banishment, 
Jeffredo presented a tribal forum to review a disenrollment and tribal government 
actions that seem to have struck a majority of one Ninth Circuit panel, at least, as less 
offensive under principles of due process. Yet, it is possible to square the two cases 
and develop an analytic framework for what tribal government actions with respect to 
internal membership decisions may trigger federal court habeas review under ICRA.  
First, it is clear that the action that the Indian tribe takes must amount to a 
detention or serve as a restraint on liberty, and thus, must still approach the level of 
banishment. While the dissent in Jefferdo makes an impassioned plea for a more 
expansive view of liberty interests, that view, while fair, is not the law. The loss of 
access to services or profits, taken alone or together, remains insufficient to make a 
claim of civil rights violations under ICRA. Second, it appears that the way the 
membership action is cast can affect the tribal members’ ability to seek review. Where a 
tribe casts the action as a criminal proceeding—using the term “treason” in the Sweet 
case, federal courts will be more willing to entertain habeas jurisdiction as a typical 
“criminal” proceeding. However, disenrollment remains a civil action. It remains unclear 
as to whether a banishment that only amounted to a civil infraction would be sufficiently 
akin to a criminal action to support federal court jurisdiction, and the murky distinction 
drawn between civil and criminal actions for purposes of habeas actions seems ripe for 
further refinement given the strong dissent in Jeffredo. Third, federal court jurisdiction 
can be avoided through sufficient tribal procedures or the failure of the tribal member 
litigants to exhaust their available remedies within the tribe. 
 Indeed, it is this final consideration—internal tribal processes and procedures for 
addressing the very real and substantial grievances of some tribal members that have 
suffered disenrollment or banishment decisions—where tribes can take affirmative steps 
to strengthen their tribal sovereignty, avoid future ICRA challenges, and provide 
meaningful civil rights to their members.  
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VI. Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty 
Sweet will be a landmark case with respect to tribal government practices under 
ICRA. Simply by getting to trial, the Sweet Petitioners developed a framework for other 
individual tribal members deprived of the liberties guaranteed to them by Congress 
under ICRA to follow in future cases. The case also highlights the risk that tribal leaders 
take when they value expediency and/or political retribution over the civil rights of their 
members. Moreover, while Jeffredo marks a procedural victory for the tribal 
governments seeking to disenroll members, the dissent’s stern warnings and the 
negative publicity associated with the case, even in victory, should be a cause for 
concern among Indian tribes who might be considering similar membership actions. 
Neither case should be read as a blank check to engage in membership decisions 
without consideration for the individual members Indian civil rights. Now is the time for 
tribes to act, before the growing banishments, disenrollments, and the Cherokee 
Freedmen debate force Congress to take action.88   
Indeed, cases such as Sweet and Jeffredo can and should be avoided by both 
tribal members and Indian tribes. Both sides can be deemed guilty of complacency:  
tribal members by not acting through the ballot box to remove tribal leaders who fail to 
protect civil rights, and tribal leaders for waiting until federal courts intervene to 
reconsider the issues. Neither should the Sweet case be viewed as an infringement on 
tribal sovereignty. Rather, Indian civil rights provide Indian tribes with an opportunity to 
bolster tribal sovereignty and respect for tribal institutions by ensuring that tribal 
members receive meaningful due process and an ability to challenge actions of tribal 
governments within the tribal system. The best way to avoid ICRA litigation and the 
resulting intrusion into tribal affairs is to protect individual tribal member rights in the first 
instance. 
The Poodry, Quair, and Sweet cases have common themes. Federal courts have 
no choice but to intervene and review tribal government compliance with the 
implementation of ICRA’s civil liberty protections when tribal members are banished and 
stripped of their tribal identity by the actions of tribal councils without any recourse to 
any judicial or administrative forum to meaningfully contest the tribal council’s action. Of 
course, even after such intervention, the remedy provided to such aggrieved tribal 
members is procedural: there is nothing that can stop the tribe from simply taking the 
action again, only this time providing the due process that was denied in the first 
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instance. However, this outcome is best viewed as an opportunity for both tribes and 
their members to create fundamental positive change as to how these actions are dealt 
with in the tribal government system. 89  
These cases teach us that Indian tribes can take three easy steps to avoid ICRA 
litigation in federal court:   
(1) make membership decisions transparent to avoid equal protection 
allegations;  
(2) provide administrative review to allow tribal members to contest tribal council 
actions through an informal review process; and 
(3) ensure the existence of a fully functioning independent tribal court system to 
review any administrative decisions.  
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to providing individual tribal members with 
sufficient due process and equal protection. Indian tribes can and should take care to 
craft provisions that reflect tribal traditions and customs, while still adhering to the 
formalities imposed by ICRA. However, at a bare minimum, an administrative review 
process should provide the following: written notice and an opportunity to be heard; a 
prohibition on ex parte communications; written procedures for administrative hearings; 
written opinions or orders from decision-makers; and an opportunity for appeal to tribal 
court. While existing tribal courts can be used, lawyers and law trained judges need not 
be required. Tribal elders can be involved to the extent tribal leaders seek to foster a 
sense of community justice. Where such procedures are provided, the entire process 
can be contained within the tribal system. More importantly, the process itself will be 
viewed with respect by tribal member litigants. 
There is good reason for Indian tribes to take these proactive steps. The 
increasing number of banishments and disenrollments within Indian country might give 
Congress reason to amend ICRA to impose further limitations on Indian tribes. 
Congress could also empower the BIA to take a more active role with respect to what 
are now considered internal and unreviewable decisions of tribes. Tribes can avoid 
further federal interference by working with tribal members and their advocates to create 
impartial forums to fairly decide tribal disputes within the tribe. Such accountability is 
needed not just because these disenrollment and banishment actions invite public 
criticism and possible federal interference in tribal internal affairs, but because it is the 
right thing to do to ensure tribal government integrity and the protection of civil liberties 
for tribal members. 
                                                 
89 
In fact, the Snoqualmie Tribal Council attempted to banish the Sweet petitioners against after the 
federal court decision. However, because notice and opportunity to speak was provided the second time, 
the tribe’s general members overwhelming voted against the tribal council’s decision and directed that the 
Sweet family members be returned to tribal member status. The Sweet family, however, remains in 
membership limbo due to subsequent tribal government disputes that have paralyzed the tribe. Interviews 




Tribal sovereignty can thus be used as both a shield and a sword. Regardless of 
how it is used with respect to tribal members, sovereignty must be wielded in a 
responsible manner that protects both the tribe and its members.90 This is the time for 
tribes to be creative in how they provide forums for their members to seek to resolve 
disputes within the tribal governmental structure in a fair and impartial way. Tribal 
sovereignty is strengthened when the members subjected to tribal powers are provided 
a way to participate in a system that is created by the tribe for its members.  
VII. Conclusion 
At the time of its passage, Congress noted that ICRA “should not be considered 
as the final solution to the many serious constitutional problems confronting the 
American Indian.”91 This statement rings true today. The question now is: who will offer 
the solution—Indian tribes or Congress? Indian civil rights and tribal sovereignty should 
go hand-in-hand. The best way for Indian tribes to avoid adverse ICRA decisions is to 
provide protections for their own members’ basic civil rights within their tribal systems. 
Such processes will boost respect for tribal institutions, protect tribal sovereignty by 
eliminating unnecessary federal court review, and will help secure basic civil liberties for 
tribal members—results everyone can celebrate.  
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